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Abstract 
In 2013 and 2019, the local government legislation of the province of Punjab in Pakistan saw two 
rounds of major changes – each of which led to a new local government Act being passed. In 2013 the 
changes were driven by constitutional and judicial requirements and in 2019 by the political will of 
Pakistan’s new coalition government. This article analyses and compares the functional assignment 
(FA) architecture of the two Acts against a set of parameters. The study finds that marginal 
improvements to the FA architecture introduced by the 2019 Act are offset by continuing inconsistencies 
and lack of clarity over ‘who does what’ in the functions assigned to local governments. The authors 
suggest that improving the functionality of local governments requires full implementation of the design 
features of the new system, including institutional strengthening of provincial-level entities which 
regulate and oversee the local government system.   
Introduction  
Functional assignment (FA) is a diagnostic approach which seeks to specify the exact roles and functions 
of each level in a system (i.e. ‘who does what’). In recent years it has become a key concept in the 
academic discourse on decentralisation and local governance, following a growing realisation that 
judicious FA choices are an important component in the division of power and functions in a multi-
level governance system, and a key element of strategies to strengthen the functionality of subnational 
governments (Ferrazzi 2005; GTZ 2009; Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017). As a technique, FA has 
gained considerable traction in Asian-Pacific countries, and can be seen in Indonesia (Ferrazzi and 
Rohdewohld 2017), India (Aiyar 2015; Davis 2016), Cambodia (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017; 
Moazzam Ali Janjua 
Independent Development Consultant 
Islamabad  
Pakistan 
 
Email: majanjua58@outlook.com 
 
 
Rainer Rohdewohld 
Ciptanet Consulting  
Germany 
 
Email: rohdewohld@ciptanet.de 
 
 
Janjua & Rohdewohld       Punjab’s local governance legislation of 2013 & 2019 
  
 CJLG 2019 2 
 
NCDD 2012, 2013), Mongolia (DPSP 2017, 2018) and Nepal (FIARCC 2017). It has found its way to 
Africa (‘Nyane 2016) and has been promoted by development partners (Rohdewohld 2018).  
During the last decade, Pakistan has experienced two rounds of extensive local government reforms. 
The first (2010–2013) followed the 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010 and resulted in a raft of 
new local government Acts in all four provinces. Unlike the 2001 reforms driven by the last military 
government, the reforms of 2010–2013 have seen little academic scrutiny; notably, examination of the 
FA architecture within these Acts has been missing entirely. The second, more recent wave of local 
government reforms, which followed the 2018 election victory of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 
party at federal and provincial level, has further changed the multi-level government structure in the 
provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). 
This article analyses the FA architecture of the two most recent local government laws in Pakistan’s 
largest and most populous province, Punjab: the 2013 Punjab Local Government Act (hereafter referred 
to as ‘PLGA-13’) and the 2019 Punjab Local Government Act (hereafter referred to as ‘PLGA-19’).1 
To carry out this analysis, the authors have applied the conceptual framework developed by Ferrazzi 
and Rohdewohld (2017), which distinguishes two major archetypes of FA architecture (i.e. the ‘general 
mandate’ and the ‘list model’), differentiates different types of functions (such as ‘obligatory’ and 
‘discretionary’), and examines the process for making assignment decisions regarding the application 
of criteria and the involvement of sector institutions (see Table 2).  The paper then seeks to link this FA 
analysis to an overall assessment of the functionality and performance of the province’s local 
government system. However, the authors are aware that this effort is constrained by two main factors: 
the lack of empirical evidence as to the efficacy or otherwise of the Punjab local government system 
operating since 2013, and the fact that the changes introduced in 2019 have been mostly informed by 
the political priorities of the new PTI-led provincial governments rather than by observable, empirical 
shortcomings (or successes) of the legislative framework established in 2013.   
Methodology and structure 
The paper is based on a desk review of the two local government acts of the province and related legal 
instruments, and a review of existing literature. The analysis of the acts follows the analytical 
framework used by Ferrazzi/Rohdewohld (2017) for other Asian countries (see Table 2).  
The paper first contextualises the 2013 and 2019 reforms and outlines the main design features of both 
laws. The second part analyses their functional assignment architecture. The third part discusses the 
potential impact of the chosen functional assignment architecture on the overall performance and 
 
1 The 2019 legislation was split into two Acts: in addition to PLGA-19, the Punjab Panchayats and Neighbourhood 
Councils Act 2019 deals with the newly-created level of panchayats and neighbourhood councils. This paper, 
however, focuses only on PLGA-19. 
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functionality of the local government system and summarises some policy recommendations for making 
the local government system more workable. 
Context and main features of PLGA-13 and PLGA-19 
Pakistan has had a chequered history when it comes to local government systems. Its “countercyclical 
pattern of local democracy” (Cheema et al. 2015, p. 68)  saw military governments introduce systems 
of local representation and political participation (such as in 1959 by General Ayub, in 1979 by General 
Zia, and in 2001 by General  Musharraf), only for these to be scrapped once a civilian government 
returned to power.2 As a result one can argue that in Pakistan, decentralisation “suffered from 
democratization” (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017, p. 188). It was not until the 18th Constitutional 
Amendment in 2010 that local governments gained legal protection and provinces – which were given 
sole jurisdiction over local government affairs – were compelled, under Article 140A, to devolve 
political, financial and administrative responsibilities to elected representatives of local governments 
(PILDAT 2013; Ali 2018). In Punjab, these changes resulted in the formulation of PLGA-13. However, 
as the completion of local elections under this Act was severely delayed, it was not until January 2017 
that elected local representatives assumed office (CLGF 2018).  
PLGA-13 and subsequently PLGA-19 stipulated several types of local governments for urban and rural 
areas (see Table 1). Union councils were established as a lowest tier of local government everywhere 
except under municipal committees (see Table 1). PLGA-13 further established district health 
authorities and district education authorities as separate types of local governments. However, Afzal 
(2018) described them as “a local government project in name only” and as “mere outposts of the 
Punjab provincial government” because their institutional set-up reinforced the dominance of 
provincial-level institutions.3  
Table 1: Types of local governments (2013 and 2019) 
PLGA-13 PLGA-19 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Metropolitan corporation  
(with urban union councils) 
Municipal corporation  
(with urban union councils) 
Municipal committee 
District councils 
Union councils 
Metropolitan corporation 
Municipal corporation 
Municipal committee 
Town committees 
Tehsil councils 
 
Tellingly, also, the law did not establish a hierarchical or functional relationship between the levels or 
types of local government. The only direct link established was that between rural union councils and 
 
2 See Islam (2015) for a historical overview on local government systems in Pakistan. 
3 For example, the district authorities for health and education received the lion’s share of fiscal transfers from 
the province (e.g. 83%, according to the 2017 Interim Provincial Finance Award), suggesting that only small fiscal 
grants are available for the other types of local government. Critical views on these authorities can also be found 
in Saleem et al. (2019).  
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their local district council: on the one hand the chairpersons of these union councils were made ex-
officio members of the district council, and on the other the district council was given authority to 
“…exercise general supervision and control on the performance of functions by the Union Council” in 
those cases where rural union councils “having urban characteristics” were given a wider set of 
(municipal) functions with the approval of the district council (see PLGA-13, Section 72(2) & (3). 
Similarly, chairpersons of urban union councils located within municipal and metropolitan corporation 
areas were made ex-officio members of their respective corporations. However, PLGA-13 created no 
established relationship or coordination arrangement within the district between any of municipal 
committee, municipal corporation, metropolitan corporation and district council. The law was also 
silent on cross-border cooperation between local governments – despite this being an important issue 
for services such as waste management, the environment, water and sewage, and for the integrated 
development of the district. Here, the PLGA-13 deviated from its predecessor the PLGO 2001, which 
had envisaged a District Mushavirat Committee for such purposes.   
While PLGA-13 was based on the concept of devolution, in practice the devolution of administrative 
authority was severely restricted, and the overall administrative set-up of the province was never aligned 
with the political set-up of the local government system, therefore perpetuating a disconnect between the 
political, fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralisation (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017). With 
the exception of a small, local cadre of public employees, local governments were given no autonomy 
to appoint or dismiss staff – this remained a prerogative of the provincial government. PLGA-13 also 
applied the concept of delegation between provincial-level and local governments (Section 65(1)), and 
also within the local government system to the extent that, in principle, district councils, municipal 
corporations and metropolitan corporations could delegate functions to the union councils (Section 
66(1)). These options, however, have (as far as the authors are aware) never been attempted or utilised. 
PLGA-13 was short-lived. Conceived in the context of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, and 
implemented after substantial prodding by the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 
its life ended in April 2019 with the passing of new legislation, PLGA-19. PLGA-13’s short tenure on 
the statute books generated little empirical evidence that would allow for an assessment of its impact, 
and there were no efforts by the government (or any political parties) to seek such evidence before 
promulgating the new Act. Limited empirical evidence from Kasur District did indicate a number of 
weaknesses, namely: (i) the lack of a structured and participatory approach to determining development 
spending, (ii) intermittent fiscal transfers from the province to the district, which hindered an efficient 
implementation of any development agenda, (iii) incomplete implementation of the administrative 
dimension of devolution, and (iv) a systemic weakness at the district council level, causing district 
councils to function more like extensions of union councils (because all union council chairpersons 
were ex-officio members of their district council) than  independent local governments with their own 
issues and priorities (Janjua and Werter 2019).  
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Having attained power at national level, Pakistan’s PTI party was able to influence the development of 
local government frameworks from the vantage point of the federal government and by using the party 
networks,  despite constitutional provisions which assign sole jurisdiction for local government affairs 
to the provinces. The federal government coordinated the legislative process in Punjab and KP 
provinces; anecdotal evidence suggests that provincial political leaders and senior administrators, rather 
than driving changes themselves, required endorsement from the federal government for anything they 
hoped to implement.4  
PLGA-19 abolishes the district as a tier and type of local government even though a district 
administration continues to exist as regulated by the Punjab Civil Administration Act 2017. Instead, 
PLGA-19 defines several types of urban local government (such as metropolitan corporations, 
municipal corporations, municipal committees, and town committees) and one type of rural local 
government (tehsil councils). In regard to elections, instead of the ‘first-past-the-post’ system 
traditionally used in Pakistan, PLGA-19 introduces a closed-list proportional representation system, 
meaning parties receive seats on the local council according to their share of votes. Instead of voting 
for one candidate, citizens vote for a party list with a defined ranking of candidates. PLGA-19 also 
provides space for non-partisan ‘electoral groups’ to contest local elections. The head of local 
government is elected directly and separately from the council, and the law provides for a cabinet of 
councillors and professionals to advise and assist him or her. There are two other innovative features in 
PLGA-19: it provides for a minimum tenure of two years for officers posted in local governments, in 
order to reduce the disruption of services due to frequent transfers; and it makes provision for inter-
municipal cooperation in the form of ‘joint authorities’ which can discharge functions on behalf of their 
member local governments. In addition, the Punjab Government passed the Punjab Village Panchayats 
and Neighbourhood Councils Act 2019 (hereafter referred to as ‘VP&NCA-19’), which introduced a 
new and lower level of political representation and participation, along the same lines as the village and 
neighbourhood councils introduced by the PTI in KP in 2013. Technically, however, village panchayats 
and neighbourhood councils are not defined as ‘local governments’ in the Punjab – despite the fact that 
they have similar municipal responsibilities, are part of the fiscal transfer system to the sub-provincial 
level, and can be delegated tasks and functions by local governments established under PLGA-19.5 
 
4 See for instance online reports by the Associated Press of Pakistan on 8 April 2019 (www.app.com.pk/pm-
briefed-on-new-local-govt-system-in-punjab, accessed 15/9/2019);  The Dawn on 11 April 2019 “PM Khan okays 
draft Punjab local govt law” (https://www.dawn.com/news/1475281; accessed 15 September 2019); and Daily 
Times on 11 April 2019 “PM gives nod to new LG system in Punjab” (https://dailytimes.com.pk/375517/pm-
gives-nod-to-new-lg-system-in-punjab; accessed 15 September 2019). 
5 For a more detailed assessment of PLGA-19 and VP&NCA-19 see Janjua and Rohdewohld 2019. 
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The province’s local governance legislation also provides for a 21-month transition period; as a result, 
local elections at any tier will not take place before the end of 2020. Until then, local government units 
are run by administrators appointed from the civil service. 
The functional assignment architecture in PLGA-13 and PLGA-19 
The FA analytical model proposed by Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld (2017) posits two archetypes of FA 
architecture: a general competence model (also called ‘general mandate’), and a model based on specific, 
listed functions, known as a ‘positive list’ model. ‘Positive lists’ are further sub-divided into either 
‘closed’ lists (if no other function can be added, other than by amending the relevant legal instrument), 
or ‘open’ lists (if the governing legal instrument allows the competent authority to add functions).    
Applying this analysis to PLGA-13, it can be seen that its FA was of the ‘positive list’ type: that is, the 
law stipulated lists of functions for the different categories of rural and urban local governments. 
However, there was some ambiguity as to whether these lists were ‘open’ or ‘closed’ as defined in the 
Ferrazzi/Rohdewohld model. This paper argues that they were essentially closed lists, albeit with two 
broad exceptions. Firstly, union councils were allowed under Section 72(1)(g) to “take other measures 
likely to promote the welfare, health, safety, comfort or convenience of the inhabitants of the Union 
Council”; and secondly, district councils were allowed under Section 77(r) to “undertake other 
developmental activities”. Both these types of local government were therefore empowered to tackle 
issues not mentioned explicitly in their list of functions. However, the authors consider that these powers 
were too weakly worded in the overall context of PLGA-13 to be regarded as some kind of ‘general 
mandate’ for local government. This view is supported by the fact that – as pointed out by a number of 
observers – PLGA-13 did not cover all public authorities operating in the local governance sphere.  
Some agencies remained outside the control of local governments: notably, the Lahore Development 
Authority (and similar development authorities in other cities), the Parks and Horticulture Authority, 
and the Punjab Agricultural and Meat Company (PILDAT 2013). 
Another weakness of PLGA-13 was that it did not distinguish between ‘obligatory functions’ and 
‘optional functions’; all listed functions appeared to be of equal significance. A long list was stipulated 
(see below), but without specifying the criteria and considerations used to assign functions to the 
different types of local governments. Only one consideration was mentioned in the Act, namely 
“improved and efficient service delivery to the citizens” (see Preamble and Section 65). Other criteria 
used in FA processes elsewhere (e.g. economies of scale, capacity, the ubiquitous ‘subsidiarity’) are not 
alluded to. There is also no evidence that any wider consultation on this issue took place in the 
preparation of the Act, or that any structured process was used to decide how functions should be 
assigned to levels of government.  
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As of late 2019, the province still had no fully functioning association of local councils; six years earlier, 
when PLGA-13 was being formulated, the existing association certainly lacked any real capacity to 
engage with the provincial government on this issue. Nor do civil society organisations appear to have 
been involved, or development partners. The involvement of provincial sector departments in assigning 
local government functions was unclear, and seemingly limited to discussions in the provincial cabinet. 
To emphasise the importance of this issue, it may be useful to detail the wide range of functions 
expected of local governments under PGLA-13.  Within the Act, the functions of each level of local 
government (with the exception of the  district authorities for education and health) were grouped into 
clusters: (i) budget and finance, (ii) regulation and enforcement, (iii) planning (including spatial 
planning), (iv) economic development (v) municipal services and infrastructure, (vi) population 
registration (vii) emergency and disaster relief, (viii) social welfare/social protection, (ix) cultural 
affairs, (x) oversight and facilitation, and (xi) other functions. Not all functions were assigned to all 
levels, but the overall functional load for local governments was considerable. Under PLGA-13, all 
levels of local government were able to approve budgets and had the authority to establish levies, 
charges, fees and local taxes. These, however, needed to be vetted by the provincial government before 
entering into force. All local governments also had the authority to frame and enforce local bye-laws 
and regulations, and could issue licences and permits. Schedule VIII of the law contained a detailed 
description of these ‘general powers’ of local government. Framing and enforcement of rules, however, 
fell within the ambit of the provincial government.  
All local governments were also tasked with land use and spatial planning (including those union 
councils ‘having urban characteristics’). Significant functions for economic development were 
mentioned mainly for the municipal and metropolitan corporations, which were empowered to 
“promote technological parks, cottage, and small and medium size enterprises” (Section 87(1)(cc)). 
Economic functions of rural local governments were mainly in the fields of animal husbandry, cattle 
fairs and the provision of cattle pounds. The large majority of functions listed in the 2013 legislation 
were in the field of municipal services, such as paths and roads, public buildings and public spaces, 
street lighting, water and sanitation, waste management etc. In addition to providing and maintain rural 
water supply schemes, an amendment of the Act in 2017 specifically expanded the union councils’ 
responsibility to include sanitation and solid waste collection, as well as sanitary disposal of solid, 
liquid, industrial and hospital waste. There was substantial overlap in these functions, since the possible 
linkages between the local governments which establish and manage public infrastructure (such as 
water supply systems) were not mentioned and considerations relating to economies of scale were not 
reflected. For the urban local bodies, the financially lucrative function of regulating “affixing of sign-
boards and advertisements” was exempted in those localities where this function was being performed 
by the (provincial) Parks and Horticulture Authority.  
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Population registration functions (such as the registration of births and deaths) remained with the union 
councils and municipal committees. All local governments shared responsibility for emergency and 
disaster relief activities.  The only social welfare function mentioned in PLGA-13 was the provision of 
relief for widows, orphans, the poor, persons in distress, and children and persons with disabilities; this 
function was only mentioned for the district councils and the urban corporations. Cultural affairs, such 
as organising fairs and local sports events, establishing libraries and reading rooms, or even museums 
and art galleries (in case of the urban corporations) were another significant element of the functional 
load given to local governments. Oversight and facilitation roles were specified only at union council 
and district council level. The former level was tasked to identify deficiencies in service delivery and 
make recommendations to the other local governments. District councils were to ‘assist’ those union 
councils which have urban characteristics in the discharge of the municipal services allocated to this 
type of union council. Otherwise, the law was silent about the mutual relationships between the different 
types of local government.  
Other functions specified in the lists included, for instance, maintenance of data and information 
systems, maintenance of municipal archives and records, and – in the case of union councils – 
community mobilisation. For both union councils and municipal committees, the establishment of a 
dispute settlement system was an important function: they should nominate members of dispute 
resolution committees, known as panchayat or musalihat anjuman, and monitor their performance (see 
Chapter XII of the PLGA-13). The urban local governments (i.e. municipal committees, municipal 
corporations and metropolitan corporations) did have powers to delegate or outsource the discharge of 
their functions to other entities. According to Section 81(3), a municipal committee could “…assign or 
outsource any of its functions in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed”. 
Likewise, under Section 87(2) both metropolitan and municipal corporations could “…entrust any of 
[their] functions to a person, an authority, agency or company through a contractual arrangement, on 
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed”. This was in addition to the option to delegate 
functions to other local governments as described above. This stipulation in PLGA-13 was in marked 
contrast to the KP Local Government Act 2013, whose Section 115A clearly stipulated the contracting-
out of services as an exclusive responsibility of the provincial government. 
Table 2 below compares Punjab’s FA architecture under both PLGA-13 and PLGA-19 with that of 
other Asian-Pacific countries, as well as Pakistan’s KP province. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Functional assignment arrangements in Asia 
 Cambodia India 
 
Indonesia Pakistan  
 Himachal Pradesh KP 2013  Punjab 2013  Punjab 2019 
Context factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Part of rebuilding 
state structures; weak 
state capacity; long-
term vision and 
strategy 
1993 constitutional 
amendment; local 
government as 
state subject; 
dominating role of 
national level in 
fiscal issues and 
sector programmes; 
strong role of 
‘parallel bodies’ for 
sector services 
1998/1999: 
democratisation and 
regime change  
2004 onwards: political 
and economic 
consolidation  
Fragile law and order 
situation; fragmented 
governance system in 
the province until 
2018; 2010 
constitutional reform 
2010 
constitutional 
reform; legacy of 
previous systems  
2018 election 
victory of PTI at 
federal and 
provincial level (KP, 
Punjab, 
Baluchistan); 
interference of 
federal level in 
provincial 
jurisdiction 
Decentralisation 
modality 
 
 
 
2001: devolution, 
deconcentration and 
delegation (agency 
tasks); in practice 
delegation 
 
2008: devolution 
(‘assignment’), 
delegation and 
deconcentration  
Devolution 
(although in practice 
mostly delegation/ 
agency) 
1999: devolution and 
delegation 
 
2004 and 2014: 
devolution, 
deconcentration, 
delegation 
Devolution Devolution, with 
some optional 
elements of 
delegation 
Devolution and 
delegation; optional 
elements of 
delegation from 
local governments 
to other entities 
Typology of 
functions used 
 
 
2001: not defined 
 
2008: obligatory and 
permissive 
Not defined 2004 and 2014: 
obligatory and 
discretionary 
  
2014: ‘general 
government functions’ 
added 
Not defined Not defined Not defined 
Use of criteria 
 
 
 
 
Not well documented 
in results of the 
review process  
Criteria applied for 
the 2009 State 
Notification on 
Activity Mapping 
differ substantially 
from those 
advocated by the 
union government  
2004: criteria devised 
and applied  
 
 
2014 revision: use of 
criteria less clear  
 
 
Criteria were used in 
the two sector pilots 
supported by 
development 
partners; but existing 
legal framework does 
not indicate use of 
criteria  
Not explicitly 
mentioned 
Not explicitly 
mentioned 
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 Cambodia India 
 
Indonesia Pakistan  
 Himachal Pradesh KP 2013  Punjab 2013  Punjab 2019 
Process 
architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
Structured; 
institutionalised 
support (NCDDS; 
contractual 
arrangements with 
sector ministries 
providing funds and 
technical know-how); 
sequence of steps 
defined 
1996: None 
 
2008: sequence 
suggested, but 
discontinued mid-
way 
None (no institutional 
structure in place) 
None (ad hoc) None (ad hoc) None (ad hoc) 
Sector involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
Integral part of the 
NCDDS-supported 
institutional 
arrangements; 
internal D&D working 
groups of sector 
ministries 
1996: very limited 
 
2008: limited; 
mainly for the initial 
steps 
1999: weak, ad hoc 
sector working groups 
2006–2015 in Aceh: 
national sector 
ministries invited to 
make their case to 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
and Government of 
Aceh working teams. 
 
2004 and 2014 national 
revisions: sectors 
provided inputs through 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
and Government, in ad 
hoc approach. 
Ad hoc None None  
Coordinating body 
 
 
 
 
 
NCDD (as 
intergovernmental 
body) 
None Weak central 
government – SNG 
coordinating body; FA 
process under the 
leadership of 
coordinating Ministry for 
State Reform 
(1999/2000), State 
Ministry of Regional 
Autonomy (2000) and 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
(2004 and 2014) 
None Provincial 
Transition 
Committee 
Provincial Transition 
Team and Cabinet 
Committee on 
Transition (2019–
2020) 
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 Cambodia India 
 
Indonesia Pakistan  
 Himachal Pradesh KP 2013  Punjab 2013  Punjab 2019 
Role of 
development 
partner 
 
 
 
 
Substantial inputs on 
concept and process; 
support to selected 
sector ministries; 
institutional funding of 
NCDDS 
1996: none 
 
2008: conceptual 
inputs and process 
architecture 
1999–2003: significant 
conceptual inputs  
 
2004: some support but 
marginal influence  
 
2006-2009: significant 
support and influence in 
case of Aceh 2004: little 
support and influence  
Limited None Limited 
Role of non-state 
actors from civil 
society and private 
sector 
Very limited None Limited None None None 
Involvement of SNG 
 
Very limited None Limited (however veto 
role of SNG association 
in 2004 law revision) 
None None None 
Key: NCDD: National Committee for Subnational Democratic Development (Cambodia); NCDD-S: National Committee for Subnational Democratic Development – Secretariat 
(Cambodia); D&D: Deconcentration & Decentralisation; SNG: Subnational Government 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017 (Table 6.4) 
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Functional assignment under PLGA-19 
The PLGA-19 does not deviate substantially from its predecessor as far as the basic features of its FA 
architecture are concerned: it follows the list model and also avoids explicitly defining functions as 
either ‘obligatory’ or ‘discretionary’. As in 2013, there has been no structured process to discuss the 
assignment of functions with the provincial sector departments. Still, some modifications are 
noteworthy. For example, Section 5 (1) outlines in a very general manner the purpose and functions of 
local government by stating that, subject to and to the extent given under PLGA-19, “every local 
government shall have the authority to run the affairs of [its] respective local area without improper 
interference”. This mandate will include to:  
exercise its authority and to incur expenditure in the best interests of the residents without 
any favour or prejudice in a democratic and accountable manner, to involve all residents 
in running its affairs and from time to time consult them on the level, quality, range and 
impact of services, to provide services in a financially and environmentally sustainable 
manner, to give equitable access to services; and to promote and undertake development 
in the respective local area (Section 5(2).  
 
This formulation, weak as it is, gives at least some direction for the purpose and the activities of a local 
government. Like its predecessor, PLGA-19 stipulates that local governments must work ‘within the 
provincial framework’; it also includes a considerable number of stipulations allowing the provincial 
government to direct local governments to undertake initiatives, to prevent local governments from 
other initiatives, to suspend and dissolve a local government, and to interfere in the scope of local 
government functions.  
The detailed lists of functions in PLGA-19 can be found in the Third Schedule (for metropolitan 
corporations, municipal corporations and municipal committees), in the Fourth Schedule (for town 
committees) and in the Fifth Schedule (for tehsil councils). In each Schedule, functions are listed within 
two parts: Part 1 lists functions which local governments  perform “in such manner and to such extent 
as may be directed by the Government” [Section 21(2)], while Part 2 lists functions which local 
governments perform in a manner and to the extent determined by the council. The wording of the Act 
can be interpreted in such a way that the Part 1 functions represent ‘delegated’ functions (since the 
Government determines the ‘what’ and the ‘how’),6 whereas Part 2 functions can be seen as ‘devolved’ 
functions, since PLGA-19 outlines the ‘what’ while the local council determines the ‘how’. Although, 
as noted above, the law does not make a clear distinction between obligatory and discretionary 
functions, the formulation ‘shall perform’ indicates that both Part 1 and Part 2 functions should be 
regarded as obligatory functions. This distinction was not at all evident in the prior PLGA-13. 
Depending on their size and type, local governments have functions related to economic affairs (e.g. 
economic value chain development); social services (e.g. primary and secondary education facilities; 
 
6 See Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2017, p. 13ff. on how to distinguish delegated functions from devolved and 
deconcentrated functions. 
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pre-schools; primary healthcare facilities; children's services; community safety); infrastructure and 
municipal services (e.g. city roads and traffic management; water supply, sewerage and sanitation; 
solid waste management; building regulations; land use planning; burials and cremations; public 
conveniences; slaughtering of animals; licensing markets and fairs; parking; transport, parks and 
landscape development; signboards and advertisements; regulatory enforcement in assigned areas); 
citizen registration (e.g. registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces); cultural affairs (e.g. 
arts and recreation, museums, galleries, libraries, sports); emergency planning and relief; and 
environmental health and awareness services.  
However, the formulation of the functions is often vague (the term ‘value chain development’ is a good 
example), and for numerous functions a more detailed unbundling and discussion with the sector 
institutions concerned will be required to give clarity to local governments on what is expected and/or 
permitted. A positive innovation of the law relates to municipal services within the territorial 
jurisdiction of  metropolitan corporations: Section 21(2) of the PLGA-19 eliminates the duality of 
politically elected local governments and technical-administrative service providers (such as local 
development authorities, water and sanitation agencies, solid waste companies, parking companies, 
park and horticulture authorities etc.) which have been accountable only to the provincial government. 
The metropolitan corporations’ full control over these service providers signifies a significant increase 
of their operational and political space and will hopefully remove the existing overlap of mandates 
between the provincial and local level  
Discussion and recommendations 
The FA architecture of PLGA-19 shows marginal positive changes compared to its predecessor 
legislation. It provides the option to strengthen the functional responsibility of metropolitan 
corporations, by bringing previously semi-autonomous public authorities (which deal with local 
government functions but are run by the provincial government) under the control of elected 
metropolitan mayors.7 It also widens the scope of local government functions, as education and some 
health  functions are assigned once again to the local governments (rather than residing in structures 
which are devolved in name only). Overall, PLGA-19 focuses strongly on the obligation of local 
governments to deliver services (Janjua and Rohdewohld 2019).  
However, a note of caution is in order.  The wording of the functions (in the various Schedules) is open 
to widely differing interpretations, as well as confusion between the local and the provincial levels. 
Insufficient involvement of sector departments in the drafting of the Act accounts in part for this lack 
of clarity – but redressing this shortcoming will require substantial inter-departmental engagement 
between key provincial regulatory departments such as Planning, Finance, and Local Government & 
 
7 In 2001, a similar effort to devolve these functions to local governments was made, but could not be implemented 
successfully. 
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Community Development, and the sector departments, to clarify the distribution of functions between 
the provincial level and the various categories of local governments. It is not clear when or if this is 
likely to happen.  While the KP provincial government has organised FA workshops with the devolved 
sector departments in KP, to develop lists of sector functions for the future tehsil local governments and 
devise related staffing structures and asset requirements, the Punjab provincial government has so far 
taken no such steps.  
Yet such discussions will be essential. The fiscal decentralisation concept embedded in PLGA-19 
includes an element of performance measurement, as well as fiscal rewards for strong performance in 
service delivery; however, applying such a concept in a meaningful manner requires the clear 
delineation of local government functions and a subsequent determination of performance standards. 
Such clarification would also facilitate better targeted and holistic capacity development interventions 
both for local government officials and elected representatives – something that was widely missing 
under PLGA-13.  
Another problem with PLGA-19 is the Act’s undeclared use of different modalities of decentralisation 
(delegation, as seen in the functions listed in Part 1 of Schedules III to V; and devolution, as seen in 
the functions listed in Part 2 of the same Schedules). These different modalities risk leading to opaque 
relationships between the provincial and local levels since, by definition, technical and legal oversight 
should be much stronger for delegated functions than for devolved functions; for the latter, oversight 
should be limited to legal aspects. The authors recommend a more precise conceptual distinction 
between the two modalities in PLGA-19 to facilitate the establishment of adequate reporting and 
oversight mechanisms.   
As of late 2019, litigation against the PLGA-19 was ongoing at the Lahore High Court (and with the 
potential to be referred to the Supreme Court of Pakistan). Nevertheless, the provincial government was 
publicly maintaining its intention to conduct first local elections of village panchayats and 
neighbourhood councils by the end of 2020, and in the second phase will go for elections under PLGA-
19.  The provincial government needs to act swiftly to clarify the functional responsibilities of the local 
governments vis-à-vis the provincial sector departments well before the inductions of elected 
representatives. Without such clarification, it will be impossible to create clear accountability 
mechanisms between local communities, their elected representatives and the local administration.  
In light of the above concerns, the authors conclude that the marginal improvement of FA architecture 
in PLGA-19 compared to PLGA-13, as reported above, will not automatically result in better local 
government performance (or better service delivery). In the past, reforms of the local government 
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system have too often suffered due to lack of proper implementation,8 inconsistent policies,9 and 
fragmentation of the institutional structures and processes which enable local governments to function. 
Punjab’s 2019 legislation is more challenging and complex than that of 2013, and therefore demands 
more capacity from key provincial institutions to steer, monitor and guide its implementation. At a 
practical level, this means the availability of relevant data and information, the ability to analyse existing 
information against declared policy intentions, and the institutional capability to formulate and enforce 
policy changes. Therefore the proper establishment, resourcing and performance of institutions like the 
Punjab Local Government Finance Commission, the Punjab Local Government Commission, the 
Punjab Local Government Board and the Inspectorate of Local Government, as well as the interaction 
between district administrations and local governments, will be crucial; as will the ability of the Punjab 
Local Government & Community Development Department to oversee the local government system, 
identify and analyse policy implementation issues, and create consensus between sector departments. 
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